The static trade literature has concluded that, absent distortions and bystanders, transfer induced movements in the terms of trade cannot be large enough (under Walrasian stability) to produce the transfer paradox. Dynamic one-sector models have argued that a transfer paradox is possible, but have relied upon international capital mobility and movements in the world interest rate rather than commodity markets and prices. In a dynamic two-sector overlapping generations model -which allows for both static and intertemporal terms of trade effects-commodity trade can produce a steady state transfer paradox under Walrasian stability, and without distortions or bystanders. The existence of the paradox is due to the effect of the transfer on world capital accumulation which is shown to always (that is, for any ranking of factor intensities and savings rates) improve the donor's terms of trade. Transfers may also be Pareto-improving in the steady state, and produce paradoxical welfare results along the transition path.
Introduction
For nearly one hundred years, the economics literature has contemplated the effect that an income transfer may have on the terms of trade. The longstanding interest in this topic can be accounted for by the variety of issues that involve international redistributions of income and also the evolving context in which such redistributions take place. Early discussions of what became known as the `transfer problem' concerned the effects of post-first-world-war reparations and made intensive use of static trade models.
1 Transfers were modeled as involuntary, with a donor country transferring real income to a recipient country in a two-sector, static environment. In these models, the direct effect of transfers on welfare of both donor and recipient is obvious -the recipient gains and the donor loses. The problematic aspect of transfers is related to the indirect effect on the relative price of the traded goods. If the recipient's propensity to spend on the donor's export good exceeds that of the donor, then a transfer will result in an increase in the relative price of the donor's exportable. If this favorable effect on the donor's terms of trade is large enough to outweigh the direct effect of the transfer, the donor will be better off (and the recipient worse off). In the literature, this event is referred to as the `transfer paradox'. Samuelson (1947) argued that the transfer paradox was not possible in this environment when excess demands followed a Walrasian adjustment process. That is, even when the secondary effect of a transfer works against the direct effect, stability requirements preclude it from being of sufficient magnitude to override the direct effect. Subsequent authors have shown that a transfer paradox might occur provided that other distortions are present (see Bhagwati and Brecher (1982) , Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1985) and Grinols (1987) ) or there is a third economic agent acting as a bystander to the transfer (see Gale (1974) , Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983) , Yano (1983) and Jones (1984) ). Thus, as far as the static literature is concerned, a 1 transfer paradox requires at least a three-agent setting or a distortion. Absent these, there is no transfer paradox.
The static literature expanded in several directions (and continues to do so) 2 but in the context of the Latin American debt problem it was recognized that transfers affected saving--as well as investment--decisions and thus a dynamic formulation would be more appropriate (see Eaton (1989) ). The first attempts to construct a dynamic analysis of the transfer problem made use of a one-sector overlapping generations model with heterogeneous rates of time preference.
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In this setting, the indirect effects of the transfer are channeled through the international market for capital and the intertemporal terms of trade. Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) and Cremers and Sen (2008) find that permanent, exogenous transfers can produce the transfer paradox in this environment. The basic intuition behind this result is that if, for example, the donor country is characterized by a lower rate of time preference than the recipient country then the transfer will then lessen world capital accumulation and increase the world interest rate. With the lower rate of time preference, the donor will also be a creditor--and the recipient a debtor--in the international capital market. The rising interest rate thus simultaneously improves welfare of the donor/creditor while worsening the welfare of the recipient/debtor.
Even a cursory look at the existing literature would convince anyone that the two ways of approaching the transfer problem, namely the earlier trade theoretic static literature and the more recent dynamic literature, have very little by way of a common framework. The former emphasizes the effect of transfers on the static terms of trade, ignoring issues of savings and 1 Subsequent examples of the transfer problem involved foreign aid to developing economies, oil price shocks, and the Latin American debt crisis.
2 See e.g, Yano and Nugent (1999) for the inclusion of nontraded goods, Kemp and Shimomura (2003) for interdependent utility functions and both Majumdar and Mitra (1985) and TurunenRed and Woodland (1988) for multilateral transfers.
investment altogether. The one-commodity framework of the latter implies that all adjustments arise via the international capital market and therefore, by construction, the only terms of trade that can be addressed is the intertemporal, rather than the static, terms of trade.
The objective of this paper is to build an analytically tractable model which unifies these two literatures and examines whether a dynamic context has relevance to the transfer paradox when only commodities are traded. 4 This is achieved by casting the problem in a two-country, two-sector overlapping generations model with heterogeneous rates of time preference and trade balance. More specifically, permanent, exogenous transfers are considered in the context of an open economy version of Galor (1992) , where the two sectors produce consumption and investment goods. Heterogeneous rates of time preferences are critical to the analysis because they generate different propensities to spend on consumption and investment goods (that is, different savings propensities), without which there could be neither a terms of trade effect nor even trade. The overlapping generations model is also indispensable to the argument because it is the only dynamic framework that is consistent with different rates of time preference and steady state diversification in both countries (see Cremers (2001) ), the latter of which is a starting assumption in the static analysis. 5 Also, trade balance is assumed to maintain comparability with the static model. This implies that adjustment to the transfer takes place in commodity, rather than asset markets, as was emphasized in the original transfer literature.
With different savings propensities, transfers change the capital accumulation paths of both countries, and also the world, as in the one-sector analyses. The specific nature of these changes will depend upon whether it is the donor or the recipient of the transfer that has the greater savings propensity. 6 With two-sectors, however, there are additional developments.
First, a change in the world capital-accumulation path will now be reflected over time in the relative price for traded goods in addition to the world interest rate; that is, in both the static and the intertemporal terms of trade. As shown below, whether each rises or falls will depend upon the factor intensities of the two industries, as well as on the ranking of savings rates for the donor and recipient. Furthermore, it will also be shown that the discipline of a two-sector general equilibrium yields a relationship between preferences and the pattern of comparative advantage that increases prospects for the transfer paradox relative to the static analysis. More particularly, for any rankings of savings propensities and factor intensities, the combined effect of the transfer on the static terms of trade and the pattern of trade is guaranteed to be in opposition to the direct effect of the transfer.
In addition to formalizing the above remarks, this paper will further explore the conditions under which the indirect effects are sufficient to produce paradoxical welfare results for the donor and recipient countries. Section 2 sets out the model and derives some preliminary results. Section 3 describes the conditions for Walrasian and dynamic stability. Section 4 5 In the infinitely lived agent model, different rates of time preference across countries imply that at least one country will be specialized in production the steady state (see Stiglitz (1970) . 6 While the effect of the transfer on capital accumulation will depend upon whether the donor or recipient has the greater savings propensity, it is largely irrelevant to the welfare results. That is, we can generate a steady state transfer paradox with either ranking (see Proposition 3). This is convenient in that it is not clear whether we should interpret the high savings country to be the donor or the recipient. On the one hand, growth models generally refer to country with the largest capital-labor ratio as the `rich' country, suggesting that the high savings country would be the most likely donor. However, in the real world, developed countries often have savings rates that are far below their developing country counterparts (for example, the US and China), conversely suggesting that countries with low savings rates could be donors.
considers the effects of steady state transfers on welfare of the donor and recipient countries, both at and away from the golden rule allocation. It is shown that a transfer-induced change in the static terms of trade always work in favor of the transfer paradox, as described above. Also, it is demonstrated that a transfer paradox is indeed possible at the golden rule steady state with
Walrasian price-adjustment, and without pre-existing distortions or bystanders, thereby justifying the interest in a dynamic formulation. Away from the golden rule, it is shown that transfers may improve the welfare of both donor and recipient countries. Section 5 describes conditions under which a donor experiences paradoxical welfare effects out of steady state. Section 6 presents an analytical and numerical example and Section 7 concludes.
Model
There are two equally sized trading countries that are identical except for their discount factors. Both countries are populated by overlapping generations of two-period-lived agents with logarithmic utility functions. Each economy has constant returns to scale technologies for the production of two goods, a consumption good, C , and an investment good, I , using capital and labor inputs. At all dates, it is assumed that both countries are diversified in production. All markets are competitive, however, only the two produced goods are traded internationally; therefore, trade is assumed to balance at every date. 
Optimization by the household gives rise to an indirect utility function which is an increasing function of the appropriately dated wage and return on capital. Let the indirect utility 7 With this specification of the utility function, the dynamics become scalar, as described in Section 6 of Galor (1992) . Recent papers that utilize OLG models with scalar dynamics to examine trade related issues include Cremers (2001) and Sayan (2005) . 6 function for members of generation t in the donor country be denoted byV
Then, the date t welfare effect associated with the transfer is given by
. Furthermore, Roy's Identity implies that
Similar steps, imply that the effect of the transfer on the recipient is given by:
Resources, technologies and production
In this section we present several preliminary derivations related to production. For simplicity, time indexation is omitted from the notation; elsewhere such notation will utilized when needed.
Both goods are produced at each date using neoclassical, constant returns to scale technologies which are identical in the two countries. These are denoted in intensive form by assumed that there are no factor intensity reversals; that is, equilibrium capital-intensities
maintain a consistent ranking as the factor price ratio varies. Finally, capital is assumed to depreciate completely in one period.
In both countries and for both goods, price equals unit cost. Goods prices are set in world markets and therefore are identical in the two countries. Factor prices also equalize across countries since factor intensity reversals have been ruled out and both countries are diversified and use identical technologies. Let , a function of the factor prices, denote the labor input per unit of consumption good, and let other a 's be similarly defined. Identical technologies and factor price equalization together ensure that equilibrium values for thea 's are also identical across countries. Thus, in both countries the requirement that price equals unit cost can be written and a w , s,
For each economy, the full-employment conditions are given (in per worker terms) by 
is the world capital-labor ratio.
Differentiating the world resource constraints yields the elasticity of supply for the investment good with respect to its price,
where , for example, is the employment share of labor in the consumption industry, , and . Also,
is the elasticity of substitution in the consumption sector; is similarly defined. These relationships show that price changes affect factor prices and, via the elasticity of substitution, relative factor inputs, and therefore the supply of the investment good.
Finally, it is useful to note that as the consumption good is respectively labor-or capital-intensive and also that Ω and Δ are always of the same sign. Also, we have the Rybczynski effect
Ω> < as the consumption good is respectively labor-or capital-intensive.
Existence and stability
Using Walras' law, we focus on the market for the investment good. Country , maximizes gross domestic product at each date subject to its resource constraints and subsequently supplies 
. World equilibrium at date t requires that the capital-stock evolves according to
and also that the market for the investment good clears,
A steady state equilibrium is a solution to (3.1) and (3.2) for which k and .
Initially, the world is in a free trade steady state with . Together with factor price equalization, these equations also describe the steady state equilibrium of a closed world economy at date t . Existence of such an equilibrium then follows directly from Galor (1992) .
Below, we require the equilibrium to satisfy conditions for both Walrasian and dynamic stability. The former describes the price adjustment process and the latter describes conditions under which the equilibrium converges over time to a steady state. It should be recalled that Walrasian stability rules out the transfer paradox in a two-country static model, and is thus of particular importance. 8 8 It may be helpful to note that there is a fundamental distinction between the Walrasian stability condition for the two-sector model and its more familiar one-sector counterpart . In a one-sector model, stability is typically defined using a market for financial capital, which cannot be considered separately from the market for physical capital goods. That is, savings in any period is typically identified as the supply of capital and the demand for capital ownership is derived from the marginal productivity of the subsequent period's capital stock. In this setting, the return on capital ownership is the intertemporal price that clears the market for capital. In a two-sector framework, however, there is instead a market for physical capital (investment) goods that is 
The proof for each lemma is found in the appendix. Under either factor intensity assumption is negative whereas
wp Ik
Ip η is positive. Thus, for the dynamic stability condition to be satisfied, , and hence the elasticities of substitution, and , cannot be too small. Below, it is assumed that the conditions stipulated by the lemmas are always satisfied. 
Transfers and steady state welfare
This section considers the effects of transfers on steady state welfare in the donor and recipient countries, both at and away from the golden rule allocation.
The envelope theorem implies that
j j dw dp k dr dp
dw dp I p k k dr dp = − , . Trade balance and
p r dr dp = − , further imply that the steady state version of (2.1) can be expressed
separate and distinct from the market for financial capital. In this market, savings constitute the demand for investment goods and there is also a very clearly defined supply of investment goods. The relative price of the investment good is then the appropriate market-clearing price.
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Similar steps imply that the steady state version of (2.2) is given by
The first bracketed term in each of the above equations represents the direct effect of a transfer on welfare, and is thus negative for the donor and positive for the recipient. The remaining terms reflect the indirect effects of the transfer and are channeled through the relative price of the investment good, and the return on capital, respectively. These effects are referred to as the static and intertemporal terms of trade effects.
With transfers, steady state market-clearing (see (3.2)) is given by where and
. Differentiation then yields
where the coefficient for p is positive by Walrasian stability (Lemma 1). In steady state, the law of motion for capital is , so that
< > ) 0as the consumption good is, respectively, labor or capital intensive. Substituting into (4.3), and evaluating at the initial value of the transfer, , gives
Note that dynamic stability (Lemma 2) implies that the denominator of the bracketed term is positive. The sign of the numerator depends upon factor intensity rankings. When the consumption good is labor-intensive, the numerator is negative and sgn sgn dp d D σ τ = . When the consumption good is capital intensive, the numerator is positive and sgn sgn dp d
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The effect of the transfer on steady state welfare depends also on the pattern of trade, or
The following, rather intuitive result can be easily verified and is left to the interested reader,
This equality shows that the donor exports investment goods in two cases: i) when it has a higher savings rate than the recipient and the consumption good is labor intensive and ii) when it has a lower savings rate than the recipient and the consumption good is capital intensive. There are two other cases to be considered, under which the donor instead exports the consumption good.
This equality, together with the corresponding implication for the recipient, asserts that the highsaving country, regardless of whether it is the donor or the recipient, will always export the capital-intensive good, whether that good happens to be the consumption or the investment good and vice versa for the low saving country.
Substituting (4.4), (4.5) and
This expression and its counterpart for the recipient will reveal the conditions under which the transfer produces paradoxical welfare effects. A steady state transfer paradox occurs when the donor gains and the recipient loses, or when, and . A Paretoimproving transfer occurs when both parties gain, or when and . 
For either factor intensity assumption, is positive. Dynamic stability implies that the denominator is also positive. Thus, 
R R D dp dp
Thus, under the assumption of both Walrasian and dynamic stability, the donor's terms of trade effect is positive regardless of the ranking of savings rates or the factor intensity assumption. This result is at odds with the familiar. In the static formulation of the transfer paradox, the effect of a transfer on the terms of trade is determined entirely by the respective marginal propensities to consume of the donor and recipient. Thus, only when the recipient has a higher propensity to spend on the donor's export will there be a possibility for the donor's terms of trade to improve. But, in the static framework, preference attributes need not have any bearing on the pattern of comparative advantage. In our dynamic context, a large relative propensity to save is associated with a relative abundance of capital in the steady state and thus a comparative advantage in whichever good is capital-intensive. In other words, in the dynamic setting, the ranking of the two countries' marginal propensities to save is inextricably linked with the steady state pattern of comparative advantage.
Recalling the origin of (4.7), it is helpful to note that (4.4) and (4.5) both have the sign of when the consumption good is labor intensive and both have the sign of when the consumption good is capital intensive. Thus, for a given factor intensity assumption, the ranking of savings rates determines whether or not the donor exports the investment good and also whether the transfer has increased or decreased the relative price of the investment good, . If, for example, the consumption good is labor intensive and the donor has the higher savings rate, then the donor exports the investment good and the donor's terms of trade improve. If, under the same factor intensity assumption, the donor instead has the lower savings rate, then the donor imports the investment good and its terms of trade, now Another way to view these results is via (4.3), which provides insight with regard to the difference between static and dynamic frameworks in examining the welfare effects of transfers.
To make the comparison precise, note that the static model has two consumption goods; hence, the investment good in our model is to be interpreted as the second of the consumption goods.
Also, j σ is the marginal propensity to spend on the second good by the residents of country . If the model were not dynamic, the second term--reflecting steady state effects on capital accumulation--would be zero. In this case, if the donor had the higher savings rate, a transfer j 15 would imply an unambiguous deterioration in the donor's terms of trade under Walrasian stability. As the earlier literature suggested, this would reinforce rather than negate the direct effects of the transfer and obviate the possibility of a transfer paradox. In a dynamic model, however, the effects on steady state capital accumulation must also be taken into account and are reflected by a non-zero second term. Thus, for the same scenario just described, a transfer of income to the low-saving country now reduces world steady state capital accumulation. When the investment good is capital intensive, the scarcity thus introduced has a positive influence on the donor's terms of trade (see(4.4)) and consequently reintroduces the possibility of the transfer paradox.
Proposition 2 Suppose
. Then, and must together be sufficiently large to ensure dynamic stability but sufficiently small to ensure the transfer paradox.
, then 1 ρ = (4.1), (4.2) and trade balance imply that = . It is then sufficient to identify conditions for which , or equivalently (from Proposition 2 establishes that the static terms of trade effect alone may in fact be large enough to dominate the direct effect of the transfer under Walrasian stability in a dynamic model.
It is interesting to further note that, even with general functional forms, neither a factor intensity assumption nor a ranking of savings propensities are required for this result. To further clarify the requirements on the elasticities of substitution, however, a special case is considered where both industries have a common elasticity of substitution. Under this simplification, it is possible to be precise about the range within which the elasticity is consistent with stability and a transfer paradox. intertemporal term given by t have differing savings rates. Again, the transfer paradox does not depend upon wheth it is the donor or the recipient that has the higher savin e, nor does it depend upon a particular factor intensity ranking.
Proposition 3 If
Next, (4.1) and (4.2) are reconsidered when the initial world steady state capital-labor ratio deviates from the golden rule level; that is, when 
. The world capital-labor evolves according to
. From these two expressions it can be shown that
Substituting , as given by (5.2), and into the version of (5.1) yields
period when the bracketed expression is positive.
11 Repeated substitution using (5.2) implies that . Using the date and versions of this equality in (5.1) n . The transfer scheme increases welfare for country if
Hence the transfer increases welfare in the donor country of the generation born in the initial
gives the date t are effect in the donor cou
This expression will be used, in the numerical analysis below, to determine w
hether a welfare provement is possible for the transitional generations in the donor country. im
An example
This section reexamines the welfare findings described abo unctions for the consumption and investment goods: 
Also, the world resource c
on LI λ , namely that the world per capit , it follows that
. Thus, at the initial steady
, and
Finally, the initial steady state capital-labor ratio must satisfy m et-clearing,
. This capitallabor ratio implies a world return on capital equal to .
( )
With these specifications, dynamic stability (Lemma 2) requires
, which is always satisfied since This imposed similarity in savings rates prevents the country-specific steady state capital-labor ratios from lying outside the steady state cone of diversification. By comparison with (6.1), the analytical requirements for factor price equalization are not in apparent contradiction to those for a transfer paradox at the golden rule.
Away from the golden rule, the donor experiences a (paradoxical) steady state welfare improvement if These values imply that , , , ; this value increases at each subsequent date until it converges to the steady state value of 1.03.
1 >

Conclusion
This paper explores the welfare implications of permanent international transfers in a two-sector overlapping generations model. Within this framework, it has been possible to provide an analysis that incorporates both the static effects described by the early trade theoretic literature and also the dynamic effects explored by dynamic one-sector models. It is demonstrated that the effects of an international transfer on the static terms of trade always work in favor of a steady state transfer paradox, though elasticities of substitution can neither be too large nor too small for the transfer paradox to arise. Moreover, neither Walrasian nor dynamic stability are sufficient to rule out the possibility of a transfer paradox, in contrast to results from static analyses. Dynamics imply an additional intertemporal terms of trade effect which has a uniform influence on the welfare of both donor and recipient in the steady state, thus making it possible for both to experience a welfare improvement. It is also possible for the donor to experience a paradoxical welfare improvement in the transitional periods.
